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Monday, May 18, 2020

Foreign Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing in Somali Waters Perpetuates Conflict

Quantifying Foreign Fishing in Somali Waters

We combined three approaches: (1) spatial allocation of RFMO-reported catch of highly migratory species (HMS) done by the Sea Around Us (Cashion et al., 2018), (2) catch reconstruction, and (3) analysis of Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) vessel broadcast data. Where available, we used information on catch composition to allocate catch into species or taxonomic groups. Following Pitcher et al. (2002), we created a detailed fishery timeline through extensive searches of the literature, expert interviews, and conversations with Somalis (available at http://securefisheries.org/sites/default/files/SomaliFisheriesTimeline.xlsx). We began our estimation in 1981, when foreign fishing began to proliferate.
Spatial Allocation of Highly Migratory Species Catch

Catch of highly migratory species (HMS) was estimated using the spatialized industrial large pelagic catch data of the Sea Around Us at the University of British Columbia (Le Manach et al., 2016). This dataset harmonizes data from those Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) that manage large pelagic species fisheries including tuna, billfishes, and sharks and reconstructed discard estimates of these fisheries. Members of RFMOs report annually on the amount of fishing catch and effort by gear and location. For Somali waters, the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) is the relevant RFMO and it manages 16 species of tuna and billfishes plus commonly caught shark species (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission [IOTC], 2010). Le Manach et al. (2016) provide a detailed and technical discussion of this methodology.

We selected catch allocations provided by the Sea Around Us (seaaroundus.org, downloaded March 18, 2018) for fish catch in the Somali EEZ for commercial groups Tuna/Billfishes and Sharks/Rays for the following IOTC-reporting countries: China, France, Japan, South Korea, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom. Spain and Portugal are part of the EU party. Russia is no longer a party to the IOTC, but they were during the 1990s when they were fishing around Somalia. These countries have a history of reporting spatially explicit data to the IOTC and our creation of the fishery timeline documented a historical presence in Somali waters.
Catch Reconstruction

We modified an established approach to catch reconstruction from Zeller et al. (2007) and Pauly et al. (2014) as follows: first, verify a nation’s fishing presence in Somali waters using searches of the literature and expert input; second, estimate the number of fishing vessels from a particular nation; third, estimate total catch by amount and species composition (where available) for that nation (referred to as anchor points); fourth, extrapolate catch between anchor point years; finally, generate 95% confidence intervals for catch reconstruction time lines using a Monte Carlo simulation and sampling ranges of vessel numbers and catch amounts (Glaser et al., 2015). Confidence intervals from the Monte Carlo simulation were used to provide estimates of uncertainty across all estimates.

This reconstruction approach was used to estimate catch for Italy, Yemen, Iran, Egypt, Kenya, Greece, and Thailand. Details of reconstructions on a country-by-country basis follow.

Italy

Italian vessels fished for tuna during the 1930s through 1950s, but data on volume and catch composition were not available. Three trawlers fishing for Amoroso e Figli operated during 1978–1979, but catch estimates were not available. We collected reliable information on trawlers operating through the joint ventures SOMITFISH (1981–1983) and SHIFCO (1987–2006) (Shifco, 1998). Our reconstruction posits the following: from 1981–1983 three trawlers were operating for SOMITFISH, and from 1987–1989 three trawlers were operating for SHIFCO. In 1987, SHIFCO added two trawlers to its fleet. These vessels were similar in capacity, ranging from 57–66 m in length. Vessels were flagged to Somalia until 1998, and that catch should be attributed to the Somali domestic fleet. Joint venture rules require catch from joint venture vessels be attributed to the flag country. Therefore, catch from these vessels during 1981–1998 should be included in volumes reported by Somalia to the FAO and in the domestic reconstruction of Cashion et al. (2018). When SHIFCO vessels were reflagged, catch should be considered foreign. We assign the flag to Italy because of the history of the joint venture and the exclusive purchasing rights of an Italian import company, Panapesca SpA.

Records of catch and composition by the five SHIFCO trawlers were obtained from Panapesca SpA. Catch was reported in kilograms for various fishery taxa aggregated across all vessels but specific to a fishing campaign (approximately 55 days in length). Records covered August 2000 to September 2006. Annual catch (metric tons) was calculated from these records, and the average catch over the period of observation (3,440 mt) was extrapolated back from 1999 to 1990. Prior to 1990, catch was reduced to 60% of the average observed catch (2,064 mt) because only three trawlers were operating during that period. One trawler, the Antoinette Madre, operated in at least 1984 (Bihi, 1984). Two trawlers landed fish and lobster in 1985, and values (1,313 and 679 mt) were reported by Somali Democratic Republic Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources [MFMR] (1985). We used the average catch by these two trawlers to estimate catch for the Antoinette Madre in 1984 (996 mt). Finally, records (Somali Democratic Republic Ministry of Fisheries, and Marine Transport [MFMT], 1988) show five additional Italian trawlers operated in 1988 and we applied the average annual catch from the five SHIFCO vessels (3,440 mt) to this datum. This value is bolstered by a report (Van Zalinge, 1988) that one SHIFCO trawler landed 1,245 mt in 1987. Catch composition also was obtained from Panapesca record sheets. For most reporting periods, finfishes were aggregated across species. However, for records from August 2000 and September 2006, we obtained family level data. We applied this composition breakdown to the larger “fish” categories from remaining reporting periods. All five former SHIFCO vessels stopped operating in Somali waters in 2006 due to high fuel costs.

Yemen

One of the earliest mentions of fishing by Yemen occurs in Yassin (1981), in which he refers to a concern about shared resource management for the Indian oil sardine. There is no mention of Yemeni boats crossing over into Somali waters; it is implied that the resource spans both territories. Therefore, we take 1981 as an anchor point for which Yemeni catch in Somali waters was zero. Twelve Yemeni vessels were arrested in Somali waters in 2006 (our minimum number of vessels), and the UN claims as many as 300 Yemeni vessels fish in Somali waters each year (United Nations Security Council, 2013). The State Minister for Fisheries and Marine Resources in Puntland reported that Yemeni vessels carry between 3–7 mt of fish per trip, make three trips per month, and visit Somali waters each month out of the year (Kulmiye, 2010). Therefore, our Monte Carlo simulations of catch by Yemeni vessels calculated annual catch by sampling over a triangle distribution limited by minimums of 12 vessels per year and 108 mt per vessel, and maximums of 300 vessels per year and 252 mt per vessel. This estimate was applied to 2006–2014, and catch was linearly interpolated back to 1981 (where the anchor point was zero).

Yemen reported catch to the IOTC during the period of 2003–2007, and we used the reported IOTC data to guide our species composition estimates: yellowfin (48%); other tunas such as longtail, narrow-barred Spanish mackerel, frigate tuna, and kawakawa (combined with undifferentiated tuna, 38%); and sharks (5%). All data reported to the IOTC originate from boats deploying handlines.

Iran

Our approach to estimating catch from Iran was identical to that used to estimate catch by Yemen. Reports in the literature indicate Iran has a minimum of 5 (Anon, 2013) and a maximum of 180 gillnet vessels operating in Somali waters (United Nations Security Council, 2013). Capacity for fish on each vessel was not available. We therefore used global estimates for gillnet vessels to obtain a range of catch per year. Pauly et al. (2014) estimated catch capacity for gillnet vessels as 221 mt per year (average) and 1,211 mt per year (maximum). Waugh et al. (2011) estimated the minimum capacity of these vessels to be 16 mt per year. Our simulation therefore resampled triangle distributions estimating number of vessels and fish capacity.

Egypt

Trawling by Egyptian vessels began in 1981. Haakonsen (1983) reported “a few” and no more than 10 trawlers operating in the early 1980s, split between Italy and Egypt. Knowing Italy had three trawlers operating in 1981, we assigned a conservative three trawlers as an anchor point in 1981. Further, we assigned anchor points of 36 trawlers during 2003–2006 (Berbera Maritime and Fisheries Academy, 2013) and 34 trawlers in 2007 (Anon, 2012). Published estimates of catch by these trawlers are 30 mt per trawler per month; of that, 5% of catch was shrimp and the remainder was finfish. We extrapolated back to zero catch in 1981. Variable estimates of numbers of boats or capacity were not available, so we did not conduct Monte Carlo simulations to estimate confidence intervals.

Kenya

Since 2004, Kenyan trawlers fished for prawns along the Juba River on the border with Somalia (Bocha, 2012). Waldo (2009) reports 19 illegal trawlers caught 800 mt of prawns each year since that time. We did not conduct Monte Carlo simulations for Kenyan catch.

Greece

Greek vessels have been trawling in Somali waters since the 1960s. “A few” trawlers were operating in the mid-1960s (Haakonsen, 1983) and “a number of” additional trawlers were fishing in 1983 (Bihi, 1984). From 1983–2010 we uncovered no evidence of trawling from Greece. In 2010, two Greek trawlers flagged to Belize, the Greko 1 and Greko 2, appeared. We therefore estimated two trawlers fishing in 1983 and two from 2010–2014. These vessels operated in Southern Somalia and may have been properly licensed. We found no information on catch rate but each vessel was 193 gross tonnage (GT, MarineTraffic.com, 2015), so we assumed the vessels were similar in catch composition and catch rate to the Korean-flagged trawlers described below. Therefore, we used the same fish catch per GT from the Korean trawlers (1.16 mt per GT) to the Greek trawlers, equaling 447 mt per year.

Thailand

From 2005 to 2009, seven Thai trawlers, owned by Sirichai, were licensed to fish year-round in Puntland. The trawlers operated continuously 6 months by transshipping to a Thai freezer ship in Somali waters, and they went to the port in Salalah (Oman) for repairs and unloading twice a year (Fry, 2009). We did not find reports of catch for these vessels. Given the similarity in location and gear, we used the reconstruction of catch for Korean trawlers (see below) for these vessels, equaling 785 mt of fish catch per year. Thai vessels reportedly stopped operating in Somali waters by 2009, although in 2018 their presence has again been observed.

Automatic Identification System Analysis of South Korean Trawl Fleet

Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) are used for collision avoidance and tracking of vessels at sea. Vessels greater than 300 GT, including fishing vessels, are required by the International Maritime Organization to broadcast AIS. Many fishing vessels smaller than 300 GT may broad AIS voluntarily for safety reasons.

Preliminary observation of AIS pings (purchased from a subscription to ShipView) and expert input identified seven vessels flagged to South Korea that were likely bottom trawling in Somali waters. These vessels ranged in size from 49–68 m long and 439–888 GT. Using the Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) numbers associated with these seven vessels, we purchased satellite AIS data for all seven boats from exactEarth (Cambridge, Ontario, Canada, March 26, 2015). These data include every broadcast point from the ships in question during July 2010 through December 2014. Each point includes a position (latitude/longitude) as well as associated vessel information such as IMO number, vessel name, flag, size, date, time, speed over ground (SOG), and course over ground. Vessel operators can control when and what they broadcast. Often points had missing information (e.g., SOG was not included in a broadcast) or AIS may have been turned off altogether, creating gaps in the dataset. As a result, estimates made from these data are conservative.

Using ArcGIS 10.3, we identified transmissions within the boundaries of the Somali EEZ. Then, using SOG communicated during those transmissions, we classified where the vessels were actively trawling by creating a histogram of SOG (Figure 2), and choosing the range of speeds defining the peak in SOG. This method of using SOG distributions to identify trawling activity has been shown to correctly identify 99% of real trawling activity (Mills et al., 2006). Trawlers 2 and 6 were present in Somali waters and were likely trawling but did not broadcast SOG.

FIGURE 2


Figure 2. Histogram of speed over ground (knots) reported by Automatic Identification System pings from seven South Korean-flagged trawlers during 2010–2014. Active trawling was classified from SOG distribution.



Next, we used the times and dates of transmissions during active trawling to calculate the number of days trawled during the time period for which we had AIS data. If there were multiple transmissions at trawling speed in 1 day, we classified that as a trawling day. Each vessel was in Somali waters for differing durations, so we counted trawling days per boat and then calculated the ratio of active trawling days to the number of days in a year for which AIS transmissions were available. This ratio was then multiplied by 365, generating an estimate of days trawled per year for each vessel. Using the same procedure, we calculated the mean proportion of days trawled per month across all boats. To estimate active trawling days per month for the two vessels that did not broadcast SOG, we determined the number of days per month those two vessels were in the Somali EEZ, then multiplied by the mean proportion of days trawled calculated from the other boats during the associated month.

Because the dataset for each boat did not always include an entire year of data at the beginning and end, we used a similar proportional method to estimate days trawling per year for all seven boats. For a single boat, we took the proportion of days trawled to the number of days over which we had data in a given year, then multiplied by the number of days in that year.

We obtained ocean depth at the location of AIS transmission by overlaying transmission points with a bathymetry raster (GEBCO Compilation Group, 2019). To calculate the total area trawled, we used the mean SOG from all boats during active trawling and multiplied by a likely width of the trawl for vessels of comparable size (49 m; Gomez and Jiminez, 1994) and by the average number of hours spent trawling per day. For robustness, we also calculated straight-line distance trawled per boat per day. For each AIS transmission point, we drew a straight line to the next consecutive point, then calculated the combined distance of all the line segments for a single day. We multiplied this distance by the assumed width of the trawl to get a second estimate of total trawled area.

Weight and species composition of catch were obtained from catch certificates submitted to the European Union for two of the vessels. The dated certificates spanned 7 months and contained catch by species of fish and invertebrates for each month. From the AIS data, we know how many days per month those two trawlers were operating in Somali waters. To estimate catch per day for a trawler, we divided catch per month by the number of days trawled in the same month.
Sustainability Analysis

The sustainability of fish stocks in Somali waters has never been assessed, and most stocks lack the data necessary for national-level stock assessment. We classified the sustainability of Somalia’s fish stocks at current levels of foreign and domestic catch using methods developed for data-poor fisheries (Costello et al., 2012). We chose species groups that are commercially valuable and had sufficient data for analysis, excluding tuna and billfishes. These latter groups are analyzed by the IOTC and we report their sustainability classifications. We used our estimates of catch for dolphinfish, emperors, goatfish, jacks, clupeids (sardines), snappers, sharks, rays, groupers, and grunts.

Sustainability was classified based on models used to predict the ratio of biomass (B) to biomass needed for maximum sustainable yield (BMSY). We used the panel regression model developed by Costello et al. (2012) to estimate B/BMSY for these ten fish groups. Where catch time series were reported for species, they were aggregated up to the family (or near-family) level. We combined catch reconstructions of Somali domestic fisheries (Persson et al., 2015; Cashion et al., 2018) with our estimates of foreign fishing to create estimates of total catch for these species groups.

B/BMSY is a measure of the current standing stock (B) of a fish stock compared to the biomass needed to support MSY. For B/BMSY < 1.0, biomass is below that needed for MSY, and fishing should be reduced to improve sustainability. For B/BMSY > 1.0, biomass is above that needed for MSY, and fishing levels should stay the same or potentially increase. B/BMSY is a function of a suite of fishery characteristics, including (but not limited to) life history characteristics such as size, growth patterns, or age at reproductive maturity, and catch characteristics such as how quickly a fishery developed, how long it has existed, or whether catch has peaked. Costello et al. created a regression model that relates B/BMSY to these characteristics. They analyzed 204 assessed (data-rich) stocks from around the world. The B/BMSY calculated for these stocks was validated by independent stock assessments. Six nested regression models, each containing a different set of explanatory variables to accommodate varying data availability, were generated. Next, the coefficients estimated for these 204 stocks were then applied to 1,793 unassessed (data-poor) stocks to estimate B/BMSY. We used their published coefficients on each catch time series mentioned above.

Specifically, for fishery i, fish family type j, and calendar year t, a multivariate panel regression model estimated B/BMSY as:
log(B/BMSY)ijt=α+βXijt+γi+δt+εijtlog(B/BM⁢S⁢Y)i⁢j⁢t=α+βXi⁢j⁢t+γi+δt+εi⁢j⁢t

where α is a constant term, β relates the fishery characteristic Xijt to B/BMSY, γi is a family fixed effect, δ is a time trend effect, and eijt is an error term. For the fish groups we included, data for fish maximum length were available but von Bertalanffy K, geographic distribution, and temperature preference were not uniformly available. We therefore chose Model 5 published in Costello et al.’s supplementary materials.

Most parameters were calculated directly from the time series of catch. Maximum length data were obtained from FishBase (Froese and Pauly, 2014). We created a database of over 800 species known to occur in Somali waters (available at http://securefisheries.org/report/securing-somali-fisheries) and these species guided our choice of length values to select from FishBase. To calculate a length value to include in the regression model, for a given family/species group, we averaged maximum length values for the species that occur in Somali waters. Although the Cashion et al. (2018) domestic reconstruction extends back to 1950, we truncated the time series to cover only 1981–2014 to overlap with our foreign reconstruction. Catch data were most robust from 1981–1987 due to relatively more reliable data collection and reporting by the Ministry of Fisheries under the Siad Barre regime (Fry, 2009). Following Costello et al., we further truncated catch time series to begin once catch reached 15% of the maximum value in the record. This reduces noise associated with behavior attributed to fishery “ramp-up” in the early years of a fishery. For most series, the value in 1981 was greater than 15% of maximum catch, so no further truncation was applied. All analyzed catch time series had at least 7 years of continuous data, the minimum required by Costello et al. to make the approach valid.

We report sustainability classifications for IOTC-assessed species (yellowfin tuna, bigeye tuna, skipjack tuna, swordfish, longtail tuna, blue marlin, and striped marlin) based on their formal stock assessments. Given these highly migratory species are in Somali waters only part of the year, our estimates of annual catch for them in Somali waters are not appropriate for the panel regression approach to classification. Additionally, IOTC brings expert analysis and knowledge to bear on these species. Their approach calculates B/BMSY as well as F/FMSY (where F is fishing mortality). They classify sustainability according to a red-orange-yellow-green 4-cell contingency (e.g., Indian Ocean Tuna commission [IOTC], 2014) that incorporates B/BMSY and F/FMSY. To make their analysis comparable to ours, we translated those species classified as orange to green, and those classified as yellow to red. For current stock assessments and classifications, see http://www.iotc.org/science/status-summary-species-tuna-and-tuna-species-under-iotc-mandate-well-other-species-impacted-iotc.
Results
Foreign Fishing in Somali Waters

We estimate foreign fishing vessels operating in the EEZ of Somalia landed approximately 2,521,318 mt of fish between 1981 and 2014 (Table 1 and Figure 1). During that same period, Somali domestic fishing vessels caught only 1,182,995 mt (Cashion et al., 2018). In 2014, foreign vessels caught 92,537 mt, nearly twice as much as the Somali domestic catch of 54,177 mt. The peak of foreign fishing occurred in 2003 (132,458 mt) as smaller regional fleets became firmly established, but before distant water fleets withdrew from Somali waters to reduce the risk of piracy (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission [IOTC], 2008). In 2014, Iran and Yemen accounted for 79% of all fish caught by foreign vessels in Somali waters. There is considerable uncertainty in these estimates. Our Monte Carlo simulations of Yemen and Iran provide confidence intervals, which are quite wide. For estimates based on reported catch, there are not estimates of uncertainty but the point estimates should be considered a minimum.

TABLE 1


Table 1. Catch (mt) of by foreign-flagged fishing vessels in Somalia’s exclusive economic zone.


FIGURE 1


Figure 1. Estimated (reconstructed) catch by foreign and domestic fishing vessels in Somalia’s exclusive economic zone, 1981–2014. Domestic catch reconstruction by Cashion et al. (2018).


Spatial Allocation of HMS Catch

Fishing by distant water fishing nations in Somali waters has declined significantly in recent years. These fleets of purse seine and longline vessels target tuna and other large pelagics as they migrate through the Western Indian Ocean. In 2003, we estimate these fleets caught about 44,000 mt of HMS in Somali waters. The decline in catch around 2005 was driven by several factors: the movement of all purse seine vessels out of Somali waters (Chassot et al., 2010), the southward movement of the purse seine and longline fleets (Indian Ocean Tuna commission [IOTC], 2014), and a peak in pirate activity (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015) that caused vessels to avoid Somali waters. In 2014, we estimate distant water fishing nations caught only 532 mt of HMS in Somali waters.
Catch Reconstruction
Italy

Fishing by Italian vessels in Somali waters follows their colonization of the Horn of Africa. As early as the 1930s, Italy operated two tuna canneries in northern Somalia (Bihi, 1984). Italian vessels fished for tuna through the 1950s and trawling for coastal demersal fishes (mostly reef-associated) and cephalopods lasted from the late 1970s until 2006. We estimate Italian trawlers landed 74,000 mt of fish between 1981–2006. After Italian trawlers departed in 2006, South Korean trawlers took over the same fishing grounds and export market.
Yemen

We find fishing boats from Yemen began appearing in the waters around Somalia, especially near Somaliland, in the early 1980s (Yassin, 1981). At the time, arrangements between Yemeni and Somali fishers was mutually agreeable and access agreements were available. In Puntland, Yemeni fishers purchased fish from Somali fishers and, until recently, this was a major trade. Yassin (1981) anticipated future conflict over the migrating Indian oil sardine if cross-border fishing continued. We estimate that, in the most recent years of analysis, Yemen caught 28,970 mt of fish in Somali waters each year (CI90% = 11,094–50,076 mt). The civil war in Yemen, which began in 2015, has significantly reduced the number of Yemeni vessels coming to fish in Somali waters (Glaser, 2015).
Iran

Iran’s recorded fishing fleet had about 6,363 boats in 2007, 1,296 of which are authorized by the IOTC to fish outside Iranian waters (Waugh et al., 2011). In recent years, we estimate Iranian vessels catch about 44,850 mt of tuna and sharks each year (CI90% = 8,988–104,150 mt). IOTC reports show most of this catch to be yellowfin and skipjack tuna, and the gillnet vessels have significant amounts of bycatch including billfishes, sharks, rays, and mammals (Waugh et al., 2011). Somali officials have recently focused their attention on fishing by Iranian vessels, and they formally accused Iran of fishing illegally by submitting evidence to the IOTC in 2015 (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission [IOTC], 2015).
Egypt

In the early 1980s, Egyptian trawlers took over the fishing niche previously filled by the Soviet joint venture SOMALFISH (Yassin, 1981). We estimate 34 trawlers caught 12,240 mt per year (2007–2014) and 36 trawlers caught 12,960 mt per year (2003–2006). These trawlers appear to have obtained licenses from the government of Somaliland through the mid-2000s. However, public opinion and law enforcement has shifted against these trawlers recently. Licenses to Egypt were ended by Somaliland in 2012 (Government of Somaliland Ministry of Trade and Investment, 2014). In 2009, two trawlers were arrested By Somaliland forces in Las Koreh (Anon, 2010b) and another was arrested in 2014 (BBC, 2014).
Kenya

Since 2004, Kenya has operated trawlers that target prawns near the mouth of the Juba River along the border with Somalia (Bocha, 2012). Waldo (2009) reported nineteen illegal trawlers caught a total of 800 mt annually. The Kenyan prawn fishery has been accused of contributing to the bycatch of endangered sea turtles that nest along the Somalia-Kenya border (Megalommatis, 2008). Recently, fishing in these waters has been banned by the Kenyan government in response to concerns about the presence of Al-Shabaab.
Greece

Trawlers from Greece started fishing in Somali waters in the 1960s but we found no reports of their presence between 1983 and 2010. In 2010, two trawlers, the Greko 1 and Greko 2, began operating and we estimate they catch 447 mt of fish per year. These two vessels have become controversial. In 2016, Somalia asked for help from regional ports to prevent the Greko 1 from landing its catch. At that point, Somali officials denied Greko 1 was legally licensed and the vessel has been under investigation by FISH-i Africa, a regional information sharing task force (Stop Illegal Fishing, 2017).
Thailand

Thai fishing vessels have been documented in Puntland from at least 2005 to 2009. The Puntland Coast Guard supplied three officers to protect a Thai trawler owned by the Thai seafood company Sirichai around 2006 (Puntland State of Somalia Office of Coast Guard Forces, 2006). The company owned and operated seven licensed trawlers in Puntland’s waters. The growing threat of piracy caused Thai vessels to leave Somali waters. In November 2008, the trawler Ekawatnava 5 was sunk by the Indian navy when it mistook the vessel for a pirate mothership. Fourteen Thai crew members were killed (United Nations Security Council, 2013). The Thai Union 3 was hijacked in October 2009 and its crew held until March 2010. We estimate these trawlers caught 5,495 mt each year from 2005–2009.
AIS Analysis of South Korean Trawl Fleet

Catch records and AIS transmissions suggest seven South Korean-flagged trawl vessels caught 27,475 mt during 2010–2014, or approximately 5,495 mt of catch attributable to this fleet. Based on import records, catch consisted largely of cephalopods (cuttlefish = 20%, squid = 19%). Most fish catch was emperors (Lethrinidae; 17%), followed by barracudas (Sphyraenidae; 9%), and grunts (Haemulidae; 7%). Each of these vessels was present and actively trawling in Somali waters for an average of 229 days per year (Table 2). During May through January, these vessels trawled 73 to 87% of days in any given month. Trawling was reduced during the period of heavy seas in February through April, occurring during 34 to 62% of days in these months.

TABLE 2


Table 2. Days per year spent actively trawling within Somalia’s exclusive economic zone boundaries for seven South Korean-flagged vessels.



Figure 3 shows the location of trawling; the vast majority occurred in inshore waters of Puntland because the government of Puntland has regularly issued trawling licenses to foreign fleets. Additionally, the continental shelf topology facilitates high fish abundance. Ninety-five percent of all trawling we tracked occurred inside the 75 m depth contour (Figure 3).

FIGURE 3


Figure 3. Density of AIS pings during active bottom trawling from seven South Korean-flagged trawlers during 2010–2014.



The mean SOG from all boats during trawling was 3.9 knots. Multiplying by the assumed width of the trawl for vessels of comparable size (49 m, Gomez and Jiminez, 1994) and by the average number of hours trawling per day (8.4 h) and converted into km2, we estimate each vessel trawled 3 km2 per day of active trawling. Multiplied by the number of days trawled per year by each boat, we estimate this fleet trawled 120,652 km2 during 2010 – 2014. Our robustness check generates a similar estimate. Total straight-line distance trawled was 2318 km. Multiplied by the assumed width of the trawl (49 m), a second estimate of the trawled area is 113,593 km2.
Sustainability Analysis

We classify as unsustainable 10 of 17 fish groups included in our analysis (Figure 4), including swordfish, striped marlin, yellowfin tuna, longtail tuna, emperors (including the commercially important spangled emperor, Lethrinus nebulosus), goatfish (Mullidae), snappers (Lutjanidae), sharks, groupers (Serranidae), and grunts (including the commercially important painted sweetlips, Diagramma pictum).

FIGURE 4


Figure 4. Sustainability classification of commercially important fish groups caught in Somali waters.



This data-poor approach has limitations that should be considered. We analyzed groups of fishes that ranged from taxonomic organization at the species level (e.g., skipjack tuna) to superorder (e.g., sharks; see Figure 5). For those groups whose catch series came from catch reconstruction, there is higher levels of autocorrelation. However, Costello et al. (2012) found results were robust to assumptions of catch underreporting and misreporting. Our approach imposes a brightline (B/BMSY = 1.0) for the classification of sustainability (above 1.0 = sustainable), but small changes in reconstruction series could cause a group to cross that line. Finally, our classification approach does not distinguish those groups which are need immediate conservation measures.

FIGURE 5


Figure 5. Sustainability analysis for sharks based on estimated B/BMSY using catch reconstructions for foreign and domestic fleets in Somali waters. When estimated catch (dashed line) exceeds B/BMSY (solid line), the fishery is classified as unsustainable.


Discussion

Since 1981, foreign fishing in Somali waters has been characterized by: purse seine and longline distant water fleets from Europe and Asia that target HMS, fish offshore, and tend to report to management authority of the IOTC; nearshore trawling for coastal species by various nations including South Korea, Greece, Italy, and Kenya; and gillnet or artisanal fishing by regional fishing nations such as Yemen and Iran that appear to fish for a wide variety of species, including sardine, tuna, and sharks.

Both the reality and perception of foreign fishing has perpetuated instability in Somalia. Somalis have accused foreign vessels of shooting at them (Katz, 2012), spraying them with boiling water, and purposely destroying their fishing gear. Some fishers claim they fear for their lives from aggressive foreign vessels (Lehr and Lehmann, 2007). Growing public anger has caused a backlash against foreign fishing. For example, Egyptian trawlers that had once received legal fishing licenses have recently been arrested (BBC, 2014). We propose five mechanisms by which foreign IUU fishing drives instability in Somalia: (1) foreign competition with domestic fleets for fish, (2) links between foreign fishing and piracy, (3) effects of nearshore trawling, (4) conflict between state and federal governments over modalities for licensing foreign vessels, and (5) a long-term reduction in livelihood security.
Competition Between Foreign and Domestic Fishers

The presence of foreign fishing vessels in Somali waters is not inherently problematic, but if there is strong overlap in the target species, we expect higher levels of conflict to evolve. Comparing the catch of commercially important fish groups by foreign (this study) and domestic (Cashion et al., 2018) fleets over the past decade (2005–2014), we find overlap to be significant (Figure 6). Of the 18 species groups caught by foreign vessels, 15 are also caught by domestic fishers. Our sustainability analysis showed that five of the species groups caught by both foreign and domestic fishers are currently being fished at unsustainable levels. These include sharks, emperors, groupers, snappers, and goatfishes, which equal 56% of domestic catch during the most recent decade. Furthermore, tuna stocks are targeted by both fleets, and two of four species commonly caught in Somali waters are classified as unsustainable by IOTC. The similarity in catch composition suggests foreign gillnet vessels are likely competing for access to the same fishing grounds as the domestic fleet, especially for demersal species such as emperors and groupers. Our AIS analysis shows foreign trawlers have been operating well within the 24-nm territorial sea reserved for Somali fishers in the Somali Federal law.

FIGURE 6


Figure 6. Overlap of catch composition for foreign and domestic fleets fishing in Somali waters. Total catch per species group calculated from catch estimates during 2005–2014.



For context, however, it is important to note that fishing has not been a large contributor to income or diet in Somalia. Current estimates are that only 30,000 fishers live in Somalia, but there is a lack of solid, current information on the number of fishers in Somali fishing communities. Additionally, cultural attitudes toward fish eating and ocean conditions that hamper fishing activity in many parts of the year have limited the significance of fishing to the overall Somali economy (Yassin, 1981).
Piracy

In the literature, piracy is frequently linked to IUU fishing (Murphy, 2011; Sumaila and Bawumia, 2014). After the beginning of the civil war in 1991, Somali waters were left without legitimate capacity for enforcement of maritime sovereignty or boundary integrity. Organized groups of fishers began targeting first foreign fishing vessels and later, commercial traffic, partly in response to the perception that the international community ignored or even encouraged illegal fishing (Lehr and Lehmann, 2007). Initially, these attacks were limited to small-scale theft. In 1994, two SHIFCO fishing vessels were hijacked and the crew were held and then released for ransom, leading to an escalation in pirate tactics (Kulmiye, 2001). These small-scale attacks were quickly appropriated by warlords with criminal networks and international financing. These criminals sought to maximize profit above all else by attacking any vessels passing in and beyond Somali waters (Hansen, 2011; Schbley and Rosenau, 2013).

At the same time, warlords sold licenses to foreign vessels in return for protection against pirate attacks (Sumaila and Bawumia, 2014). By 1998, these agreements had ended because, for the most part, warlords did not provide the protection they promised. By the early 2000s, loosely organized pirate gangs had fully evolved to a highly organized business model that brought in substantial currency (Burale, 2005) and targeted any vessel passing in and beyond Somali water, not just fishing vessels (Schbley and Rosenau, 2013). Finally, adding to the complexity, the warlords who justified their actions through protection of Somalis had actually enabled IUU fishing by providing armed security and legal means to obtain licenses (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015).

The international community deployed NATO-led naval vessels to patrol waters around Somalia to tackle piracy, but very little has been done to stop illegal fishing. Some Somalis see this as tacitly enabling illegal fishing (African Development Solutions, 2015). Pirate attacks, which in 2014 were reduced to zero successful (reported) attacks, have again targeted fishing vessels. Several Iranian fishing vessels were captured in April 2015, and at least 37 fishers were taken hostage (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015). A second Iranian vessel, likely fishing illegally, ran out of fuel and drifted onto shore in El-Dheer, an Al Shabaab stronghold in 2015 (Anon, 2015c). After paying a “fishing fee,” the crew and cargo were released.
Effects of Nearshore Trawling

Foreign trawlers operated in Somali waters from the mid-1970s until 1991 as joint ventures. Specially, agreements between the Somali federal government allowed joint ventures with Italy, Egypt, Greece, Japan, France, the Soviet Union, Singapore, and Iraq (Glaser et al., 2015). Most of these licensed ventures dissolved after 1991 but many of the trawlers continued operating. Thirty-six trawlers from Egypt operated along the northern coast. Five Italian vessels belonging to SHIFCO operated until 2006, at which time South Korean trawlers took over. Two Greek trawlers, the Greko 1 and 2, have operated since 2010. According to the 2014 Somali Fisheries Law (Article 33.1), all bottom trawling is illegal. Today, bottom trawling is illegal under the new Somali Fisheries Law (Article 33.1).

The damage done to the benthic ecosystem is impossible to assess because there is no scientific baseline for comparison (Anon, 1976; Stromme, 1984). In this study, we estimate seven trawlers alone trawled over 120,000 km2 in 5 years. We argue these estimates are conservative and likely underestimates because they were strictly derived from observable AIS tracks that were voluntarily transmitted. While we do not know the specific effects of this trawling on the Somali marine environment, a large body of literature on bottom trawling shows tremendous and long-lasting negative impacts due to high mortality of bycatch (Alverson et al., 1994), disruption to biogeochemical systems linking the water column to the benthos (Pilskaln et al., 1998), and significant reductions in biodiversity and productivity due to high mortality on the benthic community (corals, sponges, echinoderms, and mollusks (Dayton et al., 1995; Kaiser et al., 2006).

Four decades of unregulated and unreported bottom trawling means there is a high likelihood that considerable ecosystem damage has already occurred (Glaser et al., 2015). A global meta-analysis showed trawling of the type occurring in Somali waters (otter trawling) removes 6% of organisms with each pass over an area (Hiddink et al., 2017), and Kaiser et al. (2006) showed that a 20% recovery of trawl-impacted ecosystems could take more than 8 years. For the most heavily trawled locations (Figure 3), benthic communities might never recover before being disturbed again (Collie et al., 2000).

Unclear governance structures have resulted in conflicting guidelines for ports in which trawl vessels attempt to land their catch. In 2015, two trawlers left Mogadishu with a cargo of fish (Anon, 2015a). These vessels were then inspected in Mombasa, Kenya. Somali authorities prevented at least one of these trawlers from landing in Salalah, Oman (EJF, 2015) by invoking the Port State Measures Agreement, an international agreement to which Oman is a signatory and which clamps down on IUU fishing. Eventually, though, one trawler landed its cargo in Yemen, while the other successfully unloaded in Oman after presenting a license from Puntland (Stop Illegal Fishing, 2016). The South Korean-owned vessels continued to fish in Somali waters intermittently through 2017. Four of the vessels reflagged to Somalia in 2015. A fifth vessel’s activity ended in dramatic fashion in 2015 when it sank off the coast of Puntland. The crew was rescued by the Puntland Maritime Police Force.

In early 2017, seven Thai-owned, Djibouti-flagged trawlers were operating off the coast of Puntland. Though their operation is in direct violation of the federal Somali fishing law, they successfully petitioned the Puntland Government for fishing licenses and operated for 6 weeks, when they were joined by a reefer vessel which presumably picked up their illegal catch. These vessels’ blatant disregard for federal law, in addition to the suspicion of human rights violations on board including slavery and human trafficking, led many of the vessels to be detained in various locations and charges have been filed against individuals associated with the vessels and the direct or beneficial ownership companies (Stop Illegal Fishing, 2018).

Recently, bottom trawling has come under scrutiny by international bodies and by local fishing communities (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission [IOTC], 2015). Trawling in shallow water–and hence close to shore–draws attention to their activities when visible to coastal communities. Some trawlers have reflagged to Somalia in an effort to circumvent the law (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission [IOTC], 2015). However, bottom trawling is illegal for domestic as well as foreign vessels. Trawlers have come to symbolize the conflict between domestic and foreign fishing fleets in Somalia (Kulmiye, 2010; Coastal Development Organization, 2013; Indian Ocean Tuna Commission [IOTC], 2015). The competition for space in these productive fishing areas has led to antagonistic behavior by foreign vessels toward Somalis. Incidents like these could increase as resources decline, intensifying competition for dwindling resources.
Conflict Over Licensing Foreign Vessels

Somali authorities have worked to draw international attention to illegal foreign fishing. In April 2015, the Somali delegation presented evidence of illegal fishing at the annual IOTC conference, including vessel tracks, photographs, and documentation of expired licenses (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission [IOTC], 2015). AIS showed nine Chinese longline vessels fishing illegally for HMS during March and April 2015 (Glaser et al., 2015). Although the Chinese delegation recalled their vessels immediately, at least some of these vessels returned 2 months later with licenses issued by the Federal Government of Somalia.

Recognizing the need for clear and comprehensive laws and regulations, fisheries ministers, policy makers, and international actors are working to improve and expand legislation around Somali fisheries. Inshore fisheries development is left to the discretion of federal member states (e.g., Puntland) and offshore fisheries are managed by the federal government in coordination with member states.

Governance mechanisms that promote sustainable management with effective monitoring and enforcement of the Somali fisheries sector are needed to support long-term food, economic, and maritime security along Somalia’s 3,000 km coastline. However, governance of the Somali fisheries sector is wrought with challenges.

One such challenge is the lack of continuity between federal and member state laws and policies. Somalia’s federal fisheries law is not mirrored in the regional member state laws, creating jurisdictional conflicts. This ambiguity has enabled states to disregard federal law in the past; for example, some states previously issued licenses to foreign vessels or permitted bottom trawling (which is clearly banned in the federal law). The federal government, in 2018, requested all prior-issued licenses be canceled, and federal member states complied. There are on-going efforts to rewrite the federal fishing law (adopted in 2014) and to update the constitution to make all state laws subordinate to the federal, but this is a lengthy process and requires Parliamentary approval.

At one point, disagreement between member states and the federal government stalled progress toward effective fisheries governance. Since declaring the Somali EEZ in June 2014, policy makers have not created a federal fisheries authority to manage fishing. Meetings between fisheries ministers of the member states and the federal government between 2014 and 2017 helped build consensus on the role and responsibilities for management at each level of government. Agreements reached in April 2014, May 2016, and May 2017 specified that the federal government would have licensing jurisdiction over HMS in non-territorial waters. In 2018, a licensing agreement was finally adopted, but one issue to still resolve is how to divide revenues from that licensing.

There are ongoing discussions over how to divide licensing fees between the state and federal governments. While fisheries experts support earmarking license revenue for building a federal fishing authority and investing in the Somali fishing sector, license revenue could also be used to support the security sector and economic development. These competing needs have stalled agreement on licensing modalities, which in turn delayed both the inflow of revenues and implementation of offshore fisheries management.

Our research shows six nations were fishing in Somali waters in 2014, but before the peak of piracy, over 13 nations were actively fishing for HMS inside Somali boundaries. Today, many foreign fleets (particularly those from the EU) have expressed interest in acquiring fishing licenses if the Somali government develops a legitimate and reliable licensing scheme. In early 2019, the Federal Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources issued licenses to 31 Chinese longline vessels to fish for HMS in the Somali EEZ outside the 24 nm buffer reserved for Somali domestic fishers, earning $1 million in revenue for the government. The agreement resulted from successful negotiations between the federal government and member states, and it sets the stage for future negotiations on resource management. But the licensing of these vessels has been controversial within Somalia and public backlash has occurred over fears that foreign fishing vessels will outcompete or harm domestic fishers.
Long-Term Reduction in Livelihood Security

In coastal communities, nearshore fisheries offer opportunities to build resiliency through food and economic security. Reliable access to food and stable food prices are a key component of such resiliency (McClanahan et al., 2015), which can reduce the likelihood that tensions turn into violence (Hendrix and Brinkman, 2013). If sustainably developed and managed for the long-term, fisheries can support stable and durable communities. Given a lack of long-term monitoring of Somali marine resources, there is considerable risk overexploitation will be undocumented until a tipping point has passed. At that point, artisanal fishers will be facing severe livelihood insecurity. Federal and state ministries lack the resources to build out management capacity in their own ministries, let alone in local communities. Lack of resources and funding is inadvertently creating a cycle of support for expanding foreign fishing operations in Somali waters while support for local communities lags far behind.
Conclusion

Since 1991, Somalis have not had a viable way to manage the risks to their domestic fisheries. Illegal foreign fishing provided a form of moral justification for the rise of piracy to protect valuable marine resources. But piracy is not an inevitable reaction to foreign fishing. Conflict with foreign vessels can be reduced through reliable and explicit incentives for license agreements, sufficient resources, and political support for community-based solutions. Stability in Somalia is increasing while pirate attacks have declined significantly from their peak in the mid-2000s. Today, international donors and aid agencies are investing in coastal communities and artisanal fishing businesses. To succeed, these investments must promote sustainability while stabilizing the economy and promoting food security. Short-term investments without long-term planning or may result in overfishing and declining profits, ultimately exacerbating local frustration at international actors. Finally, these investments will fail if the international community and Somali authorities fail to reign in foreign illegal fishing in Somali waters.
Author Contributions

SG and PR designed the research and created the fishery time line. SG conducted the catch reconstruction and sustainability analysis. PR conducted the analysis of AIS data. All authors contributed to the writing and preparation of the manuscript.
Funding

This work was supported by the One Earth Future Foundation.
Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Acknowledgments

Parts of the research presented here are updated from and based on earlier work presented in the report Securing Somali Fisheries, cited here as Glaser et al. (2015). We are indebted to many Somalis who provided photographs, stories, and information about their lives as fishers, particularly Yusuf Abdilahi Gulled Ahmed and Jama Mohamud Ali. We are incredibly grateful for expert feedback from people who have lived and worked in Somalia and the region, including Julien Million, Andy Read, Marcel Kroese, Per Erik Bergh, Jorge Torrens, Kifle Hagos, and Stephen Akester. We wish to thank the team at Oceans Beyond Piracy, including Jon Huggins, Jerome Michelet, Jens Vestergaard Madsen, John Steed, Matthew Walje, Ben Lawellin, and Peter Kerins. We had significant assistance from Shuraako members Abdikarim Gole and Mahad Awale who spoke directly with Somali fishers. Dyhia Belhabib, Stephen Akester, Rashid Sumaila, Steve Trent, Dirk Zeller, Christopher Costello, and Daniel Ovando provided early technical review. At OEF, we thank Tim Schommer, Andrea Jovanovic, Jean-Pierre Larroque, and Laura Burroughs. exactEarth provided a significant amount of satellite Automatic Identification System data. Andy Hickman provided data, photographs, and interviews that were invaluable for validating our estimates of foreign fishing.
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Keywords: IUU fishing, Somalia, fisheries conflict, distant water fishing nations, sustainability, fisheries governance, trawling, foreign fishing

Citation: Glaser SM, Roberts PM and Hurlburt KJ (2019) Foreign Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing in Somali Waters Perpetuates Conflict. Front. Mar. Sci. 6:704. doi: 10.3389/fmars.2019.00704

Received: 01 May 2018; Accepted: 01 November 2019;
Published: 06 December 2019.


Edited by:Philippe Le Billon, The University of British Columbia, Canada


Reviewed by:Reg Alan Watson, University of Tasmania, Australia
Anja Shortland, King’s College London, United Kingdom

Copyright © 2019 Glaser, Roberts and Hurlburt. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

*Correspondence: Sarah M. Glaser, sglaser@oneearthfuture.org

Sunday, May 17, 2020

Somalia's Missing Fisheries














For decades, Somalia has faced recurring famines and food crises resulting from droughts, poor government policies, or inaction amid civil war. Could the country’s fisheries become a beacon of hope for food security and poverty alleviation, despite piracy and poaching revealed by a recent reassessment of fish catches?


WRITTEN BY LO PERSSON & IDA KARLSSON


The waters surrounding Somalia – the tip of the Horn of Africa – are rich with fish. Tuna occasionally throng here, among other fish that fetch high market prices. With its long coastlines on the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden, the country has great potential to generate income from fishing. That makes it of interest to investors and international donor groups looking to help the people who live in poverty here – through fisheries.


In a land where people were predominantly nomads, fishing is a relatively new way to earn a living. Small-scale fishers face many challenges here, ranging from lack of fishing traditions to potential overfishing and competition from illegal foreign fishing, all against the backdrop of historic and ongoing conflict, as well as periodic drought that leads to national food crises.


A major concern for a sustainable development of fishing has also been the lack of reliable fishery statistics. A reconstruction of the catches made in Somali waters highlights how foreign fleets of fishing vessels poach fish and profits, preventing the full potential of the fishing sector to generate livelihoods, income, and revenue for individual fishers and the state.1


These findings could be used when setting up sustainable fishing quotas to steer away from overfishing. But widespread poverty, a lack of institutions to enforce and maintain such quotas, and security issues remain stumbling blocks. These many challenges require a broad approach when looking for solutions that consider both social and ecological factors on many different scales, from the local to the global.





A fishing boat leaves Berbera Harbor, in the Gulf of Aden along the north coastline of Somalia. Copyright Jean-Pierre Larroque, One Earth Future Foundation.

Spotlight on fishing


After severe droughts in the 1970s, the socialist regime in Somalia, led by President Mohamed Siad Barre, relocated nomadic people into fishing cooperatives. The move was intended to increase the importance of the fishing sector in an effort to reduce nomadic people’s vulnerability to droughts.


The Soviet Union supported the fishing cooperatives and donated fishing gear and motorised fishing boats. But obstacles dashed high hopes for the fishing sector: a lack of fishing traditions, limited knowledge of how to repair boats and fishing gear, a shortage of spare parts, and the absence of storage facilities. The civil war and the collapse of the government in 1991 made spare parts for motorboats even less accessible. It also exacerbated the lack of reliable fishery statistics for the region, as a functioning government remained a dream.


Even so, over the past two decades, fishing started to grow along the coast of Somalia. The nascent fishing sector now employs over 70,000 people in a country of more than 11 million, and is thought to contribute US$135 million per year to the economy, or around 1-2% of Somali GDP.


Somali fishers still struggle. “Our challenge is that we are relying on fishing equipment that was used 100 years ago,” says Jama Ahmed Mohamed, owner of the Alla Aamin Fishing Company in Berbera, Somaliland. “But the biggest challenge is foreign ships that come to our sea illegally at night,” he said in an interview with One Earth Future, a non-profit foundation that assisted in reconstructing Somalia’s missing catches.





Jama Ahmed Mohamed holds a skipjack tuna at Alla Aamin Fishing Company in Berbera. Copyright Jean-Pierre Larroque, One Earth Future Foundation.
Foreign vessels’ theft


Data on what is being caught by whom in Somali waters have been scarce. Since the collapse of the government in 1991, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has not been able to update the fisheries catch statistics for the country, and the data from before the civil war are incomplete, with no distinction between industrial fleet catches from those of small-scale fishers.


But recent detective work by researchers from around the world, including Lo Persson, lead author of this piece, has revealed a fuller picture. Extensive foreign fishing in Somali waters has extracted about two-thirds of the total reconstructed catch since the 1990s. And the domestic catch has been about 80% higher over the last six decades than what has been reported in official FAO statistics.2


The team, as part of the Sea Around Us project at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver in collaboration with One Earth Future, based in Colorado, built this catch reconstruction from 1950 to 2015 for the 200-km offshore economic zone over which Somalia should have sovereign control. They unearthed all the records they could find, from academic literature, industrial fishing statistics, local fishing experts, and newspaper articles. The few existing documents about Somali fishing and catches, of which only two were official documents with catch statistics from the Somali government, were in different libraries scattered across the world.





Map: E. Wikander/Azote.


Among the more important resources the team used was a report written by Jan M Haakonsen, a Norwegian researcher who visited newly formed fishing cooperatives in 1978 to see how pastoralist nomads were adapting to their new lives as fishers.3 Haakonsen’s report for the FAO showed how the cooperatives were functioning, including the number of boats that helped the team to create a catch estimate for 1978, for example.


Other publications such as the 2001 Ocean Yearbook fleshed out the legal problems of controlling access to Somali marine areas in the absence of a functioning government, as well as insights into foreign fishing and the close link to piracy. That connection had already been made in the late 1990s, but an increase was soon to come.4


Using these and other documents, the team made a host of assumptions, including the number of boats present, fish discarded by industrial trawlers, catches by subsistence fishers, and more. Taken together, they developed a more accurate picture of the catches from Somali fisheries. To estimate the extent of foreign fishing in Somali waters, they also used information on old and new partnerships, such as an official Somalia-Iraq fishing company, agreements with Chinese and Korean fishing fleets, and even unofficial fishing licences granted by warlords to international corporations.


Current fishing efforts offshore of Somalia – both domestic and international – amount to over 125,000 tonnes of fish and shellfish a year, according to the reconstruction, an increase from about 16,500 tonnes a year in 1950. Foreign fishing far outweighed domestic fishing, contributing about two-thirds of the reconstructed catch since the beginning of the 1990s. That means that ships under foreign flags may be contributing to a possible decline in fish stocks in the region.





Total reconstructed domestic and foreign landings and discards from Somali waters, as reconstructed by the author and colleagues. See footnote 2. Modified by E. Wikander/Azote.


Developing countries typically have limited resources for surveillance of their marine territories. Researchers have estimated that the total illegal and unreported catches around the world amount to between 11 and 26 million tonnes, at a value of US$10 billion to more than $23 billion.5 Somalia loses hundreds of millions of dollars every year due to unregulated foreign fishing: in 2005 alone, the value of illegal catches was estimated to be about US$300 million.6


“The small-scale fishing sector in Somalia has not reached its full potential, and foreign donor agencies see the fishing sector as a good investment,” says Sarah Glaser, associate director of the Secure Fisheries programme at One Earth Future and a co-author of the catch reconstruction. However, the illegal foreign fishing in Somali waters continues, and foreign boats have been accused of attacking Somali fishers.


Some researchers and journalists have suggested that the illegal foreign fishing in Somali waters led to the rise of piracy in the region, as local fishers retaliated against foreign fleets. However, piracy soon turned into big business for warlords and criminals. In 2008, attacks increased by 200%, as Somali pirates attacked 111 ships in the region, and Somali waters soon became the most heavily pirated in the world.7 Piracy led tuna fishing boats to shift their efforts away from Somalia, and fishing companies defined a large exclusion zone off the Somali coast in 2008 that represented more than 25% of the total catch from the previous decade.8





The research team reconstructed the domestic catches in Somali waters from 1950–2015 by fisheries sector with reported catches overlaid as a line (A) and by species or major taxa (B). “Others” includes 38 additional taxonomic categories (see www.seaaroundus.org). See footnote 2. Modified by E. Wikander/Azote.


The protracted civil war and the collapse of the government in 1991 left Somali fisheries uncontrolled and the waters unguarded. The catch reconstruction shows that the Somali small-scale fishing sector grew in the late 1990s, taking advantage of the lack of governmental control that was thought to hinder development during the Siad Barre era. Several foreign fleets – from Asian countries and from the EU but flying flags from countries outside the EU to avoid regulations – took advantage of the unguarded waters, catching lobster and large pelagic fish like tuna and billfish.1


“The occurrence of extensive illegal foreign fishing in the waters of a sovereign state shows an astounding lack of control by the flag state,” or the state where the fishing vessel is registered, according to Dirk Zeller, a professor at the University of Western Australia and a co-author of the catch reconstruction. It also “illustrates the international trans-boundary criminal activity of illegal fishing. The international community bears a responsibility to help support sustainable and ethical fishing through investment, regulation, and control of its vessels, and respect for international law.”
International community responsibility


Putting an end to illegal fishing could prove to be an important step in supporting Somalia on its path to building stability. A fragile democracy has emerged, with the establishment of a parliament in 2012 and the election of a new president.


But the government still needs help to face the many other ongoing problems in Somalia, in addition to ongoing food crises and drought. Humanitarian response agencies such as the Red Cross, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and UN Development Programme (UNDP) remain active in the country and also hope to improve access to maternal and child healthcare, strengthen the respect for human rights, and increase job opportunities in the country.


After the 1991 collapse of the government, the struggle for power among different clans, warlords, and rebel groups left civilians in dire straits, which were periodically compounded by droughts. The international community attempted to establish transitional governments but met resistance, mainly from Islamist groups and especially from al-Shabaab, the Islamist militant group formed in 2006. The latest severe drought in 2017 led to large-scale food insecurity that affected more than 6 million people in the country. Today, there are over 870,000 Somalis registered as refugees in the Horn of Africa and Yemen, and around 2.1 million are displaced within Somalia, according to the UNHCR. An estimated 5.4 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance and, while malnutrition has decreased, it remains a serious concern.


The FAO is attempting to bolster fishing in Somalia as a solution to many of these issues and more: improving livelihoods, establishing peace and security, and addressing gender issues, among others. One FAO programme, Coastal Communities Against Piracy, is supported in a partnership with the European Union and seeks to build strong coastal communities through fishing that enhances food security and contributes to people’s incomes. As part of another FAO programme, local youth have been trained in new fishing techniques on the outskirts of the port city of Bosaso.


These young fishers are encouraged to avoid fishing grounds that are vulnerable to overfishing, such as coral reefs. They have also been given larger and better-equipped boats that can reach waters with more profitable species, such as tuna. While the threats to some tuna species and other fish in the Indian Ocean remain high, the hope is that education will help make the fishery more sustainable.


Other FAO programmes have trained local women to process fresh-caught fish for sale, drying it in the sun to prevent it from spoiling; in addition to their salary, they get fresh fish to take home to feed their families. And men and women have learned boat-building techniques, to produce safer fishing vessels locally. Meanwhile, the FAO hopes its fishing “coaches” will pass on best practices and local knowledge.


Yet according to the FAO, fishing remains less than 1% of GDP in a country with one of the longest coastlines in Africa. Nomadic and agricultural lifestyles remain the most important for many Somalis, and unpredictable rainfall and droughts have hit the population hard. The lack of functioning government and other institutions worsened the consequences of the droughts.


Today, as the FAO and other organisations are trying again to make fisheries important, the local demand for fish is growing. They hope that the continued development of the Somali fishing sector could contribute to long-term food and economic security and help build resilience to conflict and disaster.6





Fishers in the Gulf of Aden returning home with their catch. Copyright Jean-Pierre Larroque, One Earth Future Foundation.


The recently reconstructed estimates of actual fish catches in Somali waters since 1950 could aid the creation of sustainable management plans and help to put a fair price tag on foreign fishing licensing agreements. But the nascent government, together with local institutions and actors, needs to make the plans, set up and administrate licensing agreements, and be able to enforce them. Support at an international level will also be needed to curb fishing by foreign vessels in Somali waters.


The new picture painted with the data reveals the importance of the small-scale fishing sector to Somalia and how much is lost every year to foreign and illegal fishing. To ensure that the country benefits from its marine resources and to remove the social justification for piracy, illegal fishing needs to be combatted and sustainable management plans put into place. Within this context, strengthening Somali fisheries will require broad approaches to solutions that account for political, social, and environmental aspects.

Saturday, May 9, 2020

Sustainability in Africa's maritime industry






















Some of the most important global sea lanes pass the continent of Africa. Major routes navigate the Cape of Good Hope between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, through the Red Sea and east-west through the Mediterranean Sea. Although Africa's own maritime transport sector remains relatively undeveloped, more than 90 percent of all imports and exports in Africa are facilitated by sea through ports along the coast.1 Africa is also home to one of the world's largest shipping registries. The Liberian Registry covers 11 percent of the world's oceangoing fleet.2
Issues concerning marine management in Africa are being tackled head-on by a range of international agreements. There are already four regional agreements across Africa that collectively seek to protect, manage and develop the marine and coastal environments of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean. These agreements have been widely endorsed. Almost all African costal states have signed at least one regional agreement, and only three have not signed any regional agreements. Institutions such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) are also actively creating new international agreements and protocols to address environmental issues such as marine pollution, oil spills and emissions from the shipping industry. IMO agreements and protocols are regularly updated in order to keep up to speed with new environmental challenges and the latest available scientific evidence. In so doing, the IMO has opened up pathways for African coastal states, shipping registries and ports to innovate and meet the challenges of sustainable development.
Ships that comply with green standards are more likely to be exempt from environmental taxes and fines, which could represent considerable savings over the operational life of a ship.
Africa's growth in the maritime industry highlights the potential for positive impacts on its socioeconomic development, especially of coastal states, but it also poses challenges. As Africa's maritime sector grows, with increasing marine traffic and cargo volumes through its ports, so does the potential for heavier environmental and social impacts. In this context, nascent businesses have an opportunity to ensure that, by complying with international standards from the outset, their operations will help to develop a maritime industry that conforms to environmental and social sustainability practices that will benefit current and future generations of Africans.


GREEN SHIPPING

Green shipping is indicative of the strides made in the industry to address its various impacts on human health and the environment. It addresses the preservation and protection of the global environment from greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and other pollutants generated by the industry and contributes to achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals. In practice, the "green" standard entails compliance with the major IMO pollution-related conventions and their protocols that many coastal African countries have ratified.
The IMO commitment to sustainable development is designed to encourage innovation and technology transfer. The uptake of eco-friendly ship design by forward-thinking companies has increased over the past few years, with more companies producing and using eco-friendly ships as part of their operations. As marine pollution becomes more heavily regulated, investment in new ships that are compliant with current (and anticipated future) IMO regulations is becoming a competitive advantage. Ships that comply with green standards are considered more likely to be exempt from environmental taxes and fines, which could represent considerable savings over the operational life of a ship. In effect, the higher the green standard of the ship at the beginning of its life, the longer its operational life may be without the need for potentially expensive retrofitting. In addition, compliant ships are considered inherently more fuel-efficient, which also contributes to substantial operational cost savings.

MARINE POLLUTION

20%
of the sources of plastic pollution are marine-based, through both legal and illegal dumping
Greyer, R. (2017) "Production, use and fate of all plastics ever made,"Science Advances
With more than 75 percent of the planet covered by water, marine pollution is one of the most intractable global environmental challenges, and one the world will face for many generations to come. Shipping now accounts for the majority of the world's trade transportation, and the sheer volume of freight being transported means that a certain level of marine pollution is inevitable.
Although the shipping sector has recognized its role in environmental and social protection, and has made great strides in preventing and reacting to oil spills—which are a visible environmental impact of shipping—mitigating risks to the oceans remains a concern (Figure 1).
Another environmental impact of shipping and maritime activities is the generation of hazardous wastes and other marine pollutants from ships at sea. During normal operations, crews and passengers aboard ships produce sewage and wastewater. Historically, the typical method of disposing of waste generated on board a ship was to discharge it directly into the sea. Bilge water (i.e., any water that does not drain over the sides of the ship) may be contaminated with oil, human waste, detergents, pitch and other chemicals that may be harmful to the environment. To address this issue, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) was adopted. Since its inception in 1973, numerous annexes have addressed operational and accidental causes of ship-based pollution. For example, Annex V of MARPOL prohibits ocean dumping (other than limited wastes such as food waste). However, pollution at sea is notoriously difficult to police, and international monitoring indicates that dumping at sea persists at very significant levels.3
Oceans, coastlines, estuaries and other coastal areas may suffer from ecological damage as a result. For coastal states in Africa, marine pollution also creates negative secondary effects on human health and socioeconomic activities such as tourism, aquaculture and fishing.
Plastics are another very visible form of marine pollution that have become a source of major international concern. Although most of the plastics in the oceans originate from pollution on land and reach the sea through rivers, approximately 20 percent of the sources of plastic pollution are marine-based, through both legal and illegal dumping.4 Outside of oceanic convergence zones, which are known as floating "garbage patches" of plastics and other wastes, such debris also tends to accumulate in shipping lanes and fishing areas. Plastics are immensely durable and some persist in the marine environment for hundreds of years. Scientists are only now beginning to understand the risks of microscopic plastic fragments entering marine food chains, including bioaccumulation in apex predators and in humans consuming food from marine sources.

ATMOSPHERIC EMISSIONS

Pollution from ships is not restricted to the marine environment. Fuel used in the shipping industry is typically a heavy fuel oil that, when combusted, produces carbon dioxide (CO2), sulfur oxides (SOX) and nitrogen oxides (NOX). According to the IMO, global shipping accounts for approximately 1 billion tons of CO2 annually, representing 2.6 percent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.5
With the rise of global trade and increased fuel consumption in the shipping industry that accompanies it, air emissions from shipping continue to rise. In May 2005, Annex VI of MARPOL took effect to address the negative impacts of air emissions from ships (from SOX, NOX, ozone-depleting substances and volatile organic compounds from shipboard incineration) and includes mandatory energy-efficiency measures to reduce GHG emissions.
Tighter emissions limits were introduced in July 2010 and, in its efforts to make shipping "cleaner and greener," in December 2017, the IMO committed to a "Respond to Climate Change Strategy" to reduce carbon emissions from ships. It has adopted a strategy for 50 percent reduction in GHG emissions by 2050 compared to 2008, looking to reach net zero emissions as quickly as possible.6
In April 2018, the IMO's Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) adopted the Initial IMO Strategy on reduction of GHG emissions from ships (the Strategy). All ships are required "to give full and complete effect, regardless of flag, to implementing mandatory measures to ensure the effective implementation" of the Strategy.Possible short-term measures identified include the development of technical and operational energy efficiency measures for ships; encouraging national action plans for GHG emissions from international shipping; encouraging port developments to reduce GHG emissions, including ship and shore renewable power supplies and infrastructure to support low-carbon fuels; and providing incentives to develop and adopt new technologies.
50%
reduction in GHG emissions by 2050
Target set by IMO
All new ships must be built with a GHG emissions reduction of 30 percent by 2025, compared with 2014.8
By 2050, DNV GL predicts that 39 percent of shipping energy will be supplied by carbon-neutral fuels and that marine gas oil and other liquid fossil fuels, such as heavy fuel oil, will supply 33 percent of the energy used. Improvements in fuel sources will also impact carbon intensity. DNV GL expects, based on projections of demand for maritime transport work, that CO2 emissions for international shipping will decrease by 52 percent compared with 2008.9
SOX is considered one of the most harmful by-products of the combustion of ship fuel. High SOX concentrations are well recognized as a dangerous atmospheric pollutant. The IMO has consequently also introduced regulations to reduce SOX emissions from ships. These regulations, which took effect in 2005, have become increasingly stringent over time; for example, a proposed reduction of the global sulfur cap from 3.50 percent to 0.50 percent will be effective January 1, 2020 (the 2020 Limit). Under the MARPOL amendments, the carriage of non-compliant fuel oil (for combustion for propulsion or operation) is prohibited unless the ship is fitted with a scrubber system for exhaust gas cleaning. Scrubber installation is an accepted way to meet the sulfur limit requirement.  Although the sulfur cap will apply globally, since the beginning of 2015, designated sulfur emission control areas have the further restriction of a lower limit of 0.10  percent.
Annex VI also introduced the concept of "Emission Control Areas" (ECA). ECAs are special zones that have limits on SOX, NOX and particulate matter. Recently, there have been calls to establish a Mediterranean ECA (Med-ECA). According to a report co-authored by the French National Institute for Industrial Environment and Risks, a Med-ECA could have significant health benefits for all Mediterranean costal states. For instance, compared to the impact of the 2020 limit on sulfur content in ship fuel, 40 percent more premature deaths are predicted to be avoidable by establishing a Med-ECA. The North African States of Algeria and Egypt are identified as two of the five main beneficiaries of these positive impacts.10

SHIPBREAKING

Another by-product of the shipping industry is "shipbreaking." Ship- breaking, or ship decommissioning, is the process by which ships are dismantled in order for their parts to be recycled or sold. On its face, as a form of recycling ships and their contents, it is considered a "green" activity. However, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has declared shipbreaking to be one of the most dangerous professions in the world. It may take place as part of an opportunistic activity, where ships are abandoned on coastlines with no controls on salvaging, or as part of organized ship recycling operations.
Nouadhibou, Mauritania has the dubious distinction of being the largest ship graveyard in the world—the coastline is a landscape of more than 300 rotting ships.
The most common form of shipbreaking is to have the vessel beached on a mudflat during high tide, where it is dismantled, typically by unskilled local workers. This method of shipbreaking, referred to as "beaching," is a dangerous industry with potentially damaging environmental and human health and safety consequences.
In countries where shipbreaking is common, any lack of regulatory oversight means there is a high risk of worker health and safety impacts, as well as unsustainable wages, forced or child labor, and other worker-related concerns. Weaker laws and enforcement provide a conducive regulatory environment for uncontrolled shipbreaking operations to flourish. End-of-life ships also contain toxic materials such as asbestos, heavy metals, oil residues and organic waste, such as tributyltin (or TBT, an extremely toxic compound used in anti-fouling paints). These pollutants require special containment, and that may not be feasible in informal breaking yards.
In addition to ship owners and flag states, national ports also have a duty to inspect foreign ships, to ensure that the condition of each ship and its equipment comply with relevant international regulations.
Even in developing countries that have applicable environmental and social standards in place, there may be a lack of enforcement of the regulatory requirements protecting worker rights or the environment, and corruption might be the prevailing way of conducting business. The monetary cost savings from beaching are ultimately represented by harm to human health and the environment, as well as socioeconomic impacts to livelihood from tourism or fishing.
Nouadhibou, Mauritania has the dubious distinction of being the largest ship graveyard in the world. For several decades, end-of-life ships have been abandoned there, and the coastline is now a landscape of more than 300 rotting ships. This number continues to grow each year as a thriving salvage industry has emerged, contributing to speculation that large-scale beaching practices could move to parts of coastal Africa as the location of choice. Potential host African coastal states could benefit from end-of of-life vessel recycling without compromising human health and safety and environmental protection, as there are international protocols addressing the ship recycling industry.
The Hong Kong Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships (2009) (Hong Kong Convention) requires that the recycling of ships must not pose unnecessary risks to human health, safety and the environment. To date, the Hong Kong Convention has only been ratified by seven countries and therefore has not taken effect. It will only enter into force two years after certain criteria for its ratification have been met, including the requirement that 15 countries, representing 40 percent of the world's merchant shipping by gross tonnage, ratify the agreement. The only African country to have ratified the Hong Kong Convention is the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Nonetheless, the IMO has issued the Guidelines for Safe and Environmentally Sound Ship Recycling (2012) (the 2012 Recycling Guidelines). These align with the Hong Kong Convention, so meeting these guidelines represents good international industry practice and will prepare ship owners and recyclers to be in compliance with the Hong Kong Convention when it takes effect. This has the added benefit of protecting workers and the environment in African countries.
Under the waste law regime of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention), end-of-life vessels are considered hazardous waste. Through the EU Waste Shipment Regulation,11 the EU has transposed into community law the "Basel Ban" Amendment, which prohibits any export of hazardous wastes from a developed (OECD) country to a developing (non-OECD) country. As a consequence, if an end-of-life vessel is flagged to a developed country, it should therefore not be transported for disposal to any developing country, in Africa or elsewhere.
30%
of the Seychelles is in the process of being designated a Marine Protected Area (MPA)
To avoid complying with these prohibitions, some ship owners resort to transferring end-of-life vessels to dealers or other intermediaries once the vessel has left EU territory or is on the high seas.12 The ship may then be sold to a shipbreaking yard or abandoned at places like Nouadhibou, in contravention of the Basel Convention.
Scrap dealers may also seek to change the flag of the ship to disguise its origin, making it more difficult to practically enforce international requirements. Low registration standards combined with minimal vetting of ships creates a higher risk that vessels flagged to countries that have less stringent registration requirements are operating in breach of international standards. Registries therefore play a key role in managing requirements such as environmentally sound ship decommissioning as well as human rights obligations more broadly.
In 2009 the IMO introduced the innovative concept of a "Green Passport," requiring ship operators to provide information about all the materials aboard the ship that were known to be potentially hazardous. In 2011, the IMO introduced the concept of an International Certificate on Inventory of Hazardous Materials (IHM) to replace the Green Passport. The IHM is specific to each ship and must contain information about any hazardous material in the structure of the ship or its equipment, generated through operations or stored on the ship.
The 2012 Recycling Guidelines require the development of a ship recycling plan (SRP) to ensure that the ship owner and ship recycling facility work together on management of hazardous materials, safety procedures, dismantling sequences and any other elements to ensure compliance with the Hong Kong Convention requirements.
The IHM and the SRP are crucial developments in ensuring that ship builders, operators and recyclers are all responsible for decommissioning ships in a socially and environmentally responsible manner. With improved information about hazardous materials, recyclers are able to use advance planning to reduce or eliminate environmental contamination and social risks. In addition, by having a transparent, ongoing reporting system of this kind, both operators and recyclers can ensure that they are providing for and mitigating any risks of liability for environmental contamination or harm to humans.
Finance providers are beginning to understand their role in ending poor shipbreaking practices and other environmental and social impacts on Africa's maritime and coastal environments. By conducting proper due diligence in relation to the flag state of the ship, the flag of the port state and monitoring of compliance with Green Passport/IHM requirements, financiers can support covenants and conditions for end-of- life operations to be conducted in countries where environmental protection and human rights issues are regulated, and decommissioning is undertaken by recycling facilities operating in an environmentally and socially responsible manner (e.g., in accordance with the Hong Kong Convention or, if EU flagged, the Waste Shipment Regulation).13

POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICAN PORTS

Africa ports have taken positive steps toward complying with international environmental standards concerning waste management. Recent examples include:
Tanzanian Ports Authority
Working to reduce pollution levels at Dar es Salaam through a port expansion and rehabilitation initiative
Port Elizabeth Harbour in South Africa
Introduced an environmental protection program, requiring a waste management plan to be developed and implemented
Port of Abidjan in Côte d'Ivoire
Achieved ISO 14001 certification in 2017 for its environmental management system

"BLUE FINANCE" AND THE ROLE OF LENDERS

Over the past ten years, lenders have become increasingly aware of environmental and human rights issues. In a concerted international effort for investments to move toward environmental sustainability, international institutions have been developing green industry standards. The most well-known green financing standards are the Green Bond Principles, established by the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) in 2014. Green bonds are any type of bond instrument where the proceeds will be exclusively applied to finance "green" projects (e.g., environmental protection, sustainability, climate change solutions and renewable energy projects). The green bonds market has exponentially increased since the Green Bond Principles took effect. In May 2018, the world's first shipping sector-labeled green bond was issued by Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK). Designed to support NYK's management plan, "Staying Ahead 2022 with Digitalization and Green," it aims to integrate environmental, social and governance (ESG) principles for sustainable development using the funds for new and existing projects in NYK's "Roadmap for Environmentally Friendly Vessel Technologies." This includes liquefied natural gas (LNG)-fueled ships, LNG bunkering vessels, ballast water treatment equipment and SOX scrubber systems.
As the "Green Economy" develops, gaps for the sustainable management of oceans have appeared, giving rise to the concept of the "Blue Economy," which is defined by the World Bank as "sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods and jobs, and ocean ecosystem health."14 The Blue Economy encompasses activities in the renewable energy, tourism, climate change, fishing, waste management and maritime transport sectors.
"Blue Finance" is still an emerging concept. However, the Seychelles has become the first country in the world to put Blue Finance measures into effect. In 2016, the Nature Conservancy, through its investing arm NatureVest, developed a US$22 million sovereign debt conversion for the Seychelles. Through this, approximately 30 percent of the Seychelles is in the process of being designated a Marine Protected Area (MPA).
In October 2018, the Seychelles became the first entity to issue a sovereign Blue Bond to expand its MPAs, improve the governance of fisheries and develop the Seychelles' Blue Economy. The US$15 million Blue Bond is partially guaranteed by the World Bank and supported by the Global Environment Facility. In addition to being a major milestone in Blue Finance, the Seychelles' Blue Bond provides strong evidence that sustainable development of the Blue Economy is possible, as well as mutually beneficial for international investors.
To ensure the sustainable use of oceans and their resources, in March 2018, the European Commission, World Wildlife Fund, the UK Prince of Wales's International Sustainability Unit and the European Investment Bank (EIB) jointly released a set of voluntary Sustainable Blue Economy Finance Principles (the Blue Principles). Without duplicating existing frameworks, the Blue Principles are intended to implement the UN Sustainable Development Goals, especially those that contribute to the management of the oceans (e.g., SDG 12 on responsible consumption, SDG 13 on climate action and SDG 14 on life below water). The Blue Principles are also intended to comply with IFC Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability and the EIB Environmental and Social Principles and Standards.

AFRICA'S SHIPPING INDUSTRY IS MAKING PROGRESS

With the rapid expansion of the African maritime industry, African countries have an opportunity to become world-class leaders in sustainable shipping practices. One means of ensuring the development of Africa's maritime industry is by increasing resources and capacity-building to strengthen institutions responsible for policing environmental and social legislation. Protecting marine and coastal ecosystems in Africa is essential for achieving the international commitments that African countries have made and for protecting the health and welfare of coastal populations, biodiversity and for socioeconomic progress.

1 Saggia, Gilbert. (2017). About 90% of Imports and Exports in Africa Driven by Sea at http:// www.news.sap.com/Africa/2017/11
2 https://www.liscr.com
Greyer, R. (2017) "Production, use and fate of all plastics ever made," Science Advances.
4 Greyer, R. (2017) "Production, use and fate of all plastics ever made," Science Advances.
5 http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/ PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/ Greenhouse-Gas-Studies-2014.aspx
International Maritime Organization, "UN body accepts climate change strategy  for shipping" available at: http://www. imo.org/en/mediacentre/pressbriefings/ pages/06ghginitialstrategy.aspx
7 https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/ resource/250_IMO%20submission_ Talanoa%20Dialogue_April%202018
8 International Maritime Organization, "Low carbon shipping and air pollution control." Available at: http://www.imo.org/en/ mediacentre/hottopics/ghg/pages/default.aspx
9 DNV-GL, "Energy Transition Outlook, Maritime Forecast to 2050" available at: https://eto. dnvgl.com/2018/maritime
10 French National Institute for Industrial Environment and Risks, "ECAMED: a Technical Feasibility Study for the Implementation of an Emission Control Area (ECA) in the Mediterranean Sea." Available at: https:// www.ineris.fr/sites/ineris.fr/files/contribution/ Documents/R_DRC-19-168862-00408A_ ECAMED_final_Report_0.pdf
11 Regulation (EC No 1013/2006)
12 https://www.iims.org.uk/ dirty-and-dangerous-shipbreaking/
13 EU Regulations on Shipments of Waste (EC No. 1013/2006)
14 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/ infographic/2017/06/06/blue-economy

Saturday, December 28, 2019

Isbadalka cimilada iyo saameeynta ay ku leedahay xeebaha

Dhawaanahaan aduunka waxa aad loo hadal hayaa isbadalka cimilada iyo saameeynta ay ku leedahay bad iyo biriba.
Inkastoo Soomaalidu door ku la heyn sababaha keena isbadalka cimilada hadana waxaa muhiim ah in aan ugu yaraan sameyno wax kastoo lagu dhimi karo dhibta ka imaan karta.
Waxaan isticmaali karnaa green energy oo ah ka faaideysiga tamarta laga dhaliyo qoroxda, saasoo hoos u dhigeeysa ku tiirsanaanta tamarta laga dhaliyo matoorada.
Waxaan kaloo yareen karnaa ku fataalida cuntada, sababtoo ah cuntada qurunta waxaa ay gacan ka geysan kartaa sii xumaashaha cimilada.
Hadaba waa in aan ku baraarugsanaanaa isbadalka cimilada iyo saameeynta ay nolosheena iyo mustaqbalka ubadkeena ku leedahay.

W/Q Abdi Rageh Gomad